



**Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation on
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
Women and Girls**

Case Study: Bangladesh

October 2020



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Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations/People	JRP	Joint Response Plan
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management	MODMR	Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief
CIC	Camp-in-Charge	MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ET	Evaluation Team	MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization	NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussions	NTF	National Task Force
FTS	Financial Tracking Service	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
GA	Gender Analysis	ProCap	Inter-Agency Protection Standby Capacity Project
GAM	Gender with Age Marker	PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
GBV	Gender-based Violence	SADD	Sex- and Age-disaggregated Data
GE	Gender-Equality	SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
GEEWG	Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls	SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
GenCap	IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project	SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
GIHA	Gender in Humanitarian Action	SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
GH	Gender Hub	SPO	Senior Protection Officer
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator	SWAP	System-wide Action Plan
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team	ToC	Theory of Change
HDI	Human Development Index	ToR	Terms of Reference
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview	UNCT	United Nations Country Team
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
HRS	Humanitarian Response Strategy	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
IAHE	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation	UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	UNWomen	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	WASH	Water, sanitation, and hygiene
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization	WFP	World Food Programme
IOM	International Organization for Migration		
ISCG	Inter-Sector Coordination Group		
ISWG	Inter-Sector Working Group		

Executive Summary

Since the August 2017 Rohingya influx, substantive progress has been made in the field of gender integration in response activities. Early donor, agency, and sector evaluations¹ were highly critical of the gaps in gender and protection overall in humanitarian response efforts, but more recently protection has become a focused priority across all sectors, with significant adaptations and adjustments made at the policy, programming, and implementation levels. There is significant support at the highest leadership levels for gender sensitivity in the response, so gender-sensitive participation and consultation structures have increased. The iterations of the Joint Response Plans (JRPs) integrate more elements related to gender, and there are multiple coordinating mechanisms and working groups with gender-adjacent mandates. The Rohingya response has served as a pilot for a number of gender-related inter-agency initiatives and has comparatively substantive resourcing for gender-related capacity building. A large number of gender-related studies and assessments have been carried out over the 2017–2019 period. Additionally, inter-sectoral and sector-specific gender policies and tools have been developed for the Rohingya response.

The integration of gender equality principles informing field activities and reporting is still seen as highly variable among agencies, sectors, and projects, with varying degrees of leadership support for gender equality programming considerations. Gender equality programming is largely oriented towards women and girls, with other elements such as disability, age, ethnicity, men's needs, or LGBTI concerns not consistently integrated into design, implementation, reporting, or analysis. Gender focal points are found in all sectors, but they are often junior personnel who lack the appropriate expertise or training in gender-responsive programming and who fulfil multiple roles, with limited integration into sector-level decision-making or design processes. The large number of gender-adjacent coordination mechanisms and working groups have been leading gender mainstreaming efforts and have brought further attention and accountability to these. However, having multiple gender stakeholders in the coordination architecture has led to some confusion. Further, gaps in commitments by government, sectors, and field-level operations remain, which inhibit gender-sensitive response. Personnel turnover and transitions at all levels create a need for continual re-orientation and capacity building on gender principles, including orientation on existing gender tools and guidance for individual sectors. Data on budgets allocated to gender is limited, and there is limited evidence of the use of sex- and age-disaggregated data (SADD) for trend analysis and implementation adjustments. Indicator SADD is inconsistent among sectors, although generally available in the reporting process, and gender and inclusion are often considered in project proposals and designs due to mandatory use of gender and age markers. However, the designs rarely include long-term gender transformative interventions or stand-alone gender-targeted interventions.

The Rohingya response contains many elements assumed to be necessary for programming integrating gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls (GEEWG), and there has been observed substantive progress on the integration of GEEWG principles into the response activities since the initial 2017 response. Even with these positive elements and the progress observed, gender equality programming is highly variable across specific agencies and sectors. Respondents identified a range of systemic barriers contributing to this variability, including: a) the timing of the deployment of gender expertise; b) the long and broad chain of actors involved in successfully implementing gender-responsive programming across the response; c) limited consequences for non-compliance; d) variable allocation of resources for gender expertise; and e) the establishment of gender as a cross-cutting theme operating as a working group.

¹ See for example: Response to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (Australian Humanitarian Partnership, February 2019), Cox's Bazar Humanity in WASH Sector Audit (March 2019), Rohingya Refugee Response Gender Analysis (Oxfam, August 2018), or Evaluation of UNICEF's Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh (November 2018).

1. Background and Methodology

1. The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls in humanitarian response is the first ever thematic IAHE. The scope of the evaluation is global and focuses on gender-responsive programming, capacity building, and the participation of women and girls in the 2017–2019 period. The evaluation focuses on the collective use of gender strategies and policies by IASC organizations and the adequacy of financial and human resources allocated to them. The purpose of the evaluation is to enhance learning around GEEWG in humanitarian programming in order to identify best practices, enabling factors, and tools that can be replicated across the humanitarian system. There are multiple information streams for data collection within the evaluation, including a global-level document review, global-level key informant interviews, and field missions to four case study countries for field-level validation. Full details of the overall methodology are found in the IAHE GEEWG Inception Report.
2. The following four questions and criteria guide the evaluation:
 - a. EQ1 – relevance: To what extent are humanitarian responses tailored to build the capacities and resilience of women, girls, men, and boys?
 - b. EQ2 – coherence: How consistently are existing system-wide policies, programme guidance, and tools on gender implemented among IASC members?
 - c. EQ3 – effectiveness: How effective are existing IASC-promoted efforts to strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in humanitarian programming?
 - d. EQ4 – coordination: To what extent are efforts by IASC members to strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in humanitarian programming coordinated?
3. Four countries for case study visits – Nigeria, Colombia, Iraq, and Bangladesh – were selected from among a pre-defined list and according to criteria aimed at enhancing opportunities for identifying good practice.² For each of the country case studies, a mixed-method approach was used for data collection and analysis. A team of two international evaluators (who are part of the core IAHE GEEWG evaluation team) and two national consultants are involved in each country case study. Data collection involved document and literature review and semi-structured key informant interviews with representatives from the United Nations, government, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and national non-governmental organizations (NNGOs).
4. In the case of Bangladesh, the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions required altering the standard approach to the case studies (Annex 4), with an emphasis on entirely remote key informant interviews and document review. The primary data used to compile this brief came from interviews with 43 in-country key informants (63 percent women). The full list of interviewed persons is found in Annex 1. Secondary data analysed – including the views of various groups among the affected populations – included pre-existing assessments, research studies, and evaluations with a gender focus (of which Bangladesh has produced many), as well as a review of the annual joint response plans and needs assessments. Information contained in reports, statistics, and project updates was also reviewed (Annex 2).³

² The criteria included the type of emergency and the presence of a gender advisor, gender strategy, GBV sub-cluster, gender working group, joint gender assessment, and so on. A detailed description of the methodology used for the selection can be found in the IAHE GEEWG Inception Report. Bangladesh was highlighted for its piloting of the Gender Hub project and the particularly gendered nature of the crisis, with large percentages of the population having experienced or witnessed sexual assault in Myanmar.

³ A virtual Humanitarian Aid Worker Survey was also developed to administer to all Rohingya response workers at all levels but was ultimately not administered due to concerns regarding over-burdening the workers in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic response in the camps.

2. Context Description⁴

Country Context

5. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of the Union of Myanmar are neighbouring countries in South Asia on the Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh is the world’s eighth most populous country and is characterized by fertile alluvial plains surrounding three major rivers (Padma, Meghna, and Jamuna). Bangladesh is one of the world’s most densely populated countries (1,115 persons per square kilometre) and is transitioning from a low-income to middle-income country. The Human Development Index for Bangladesh ranks it 142nd among 187 countries.⁵ Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated at \$US 1.314,⁶ with a GDP growth rate of about 6 percent per annum.⁷ Key sectors include the garment industry, pharmaceuticals, ship-building, ceramics, leather goods, and electronics.
6. Myanmar comprises a smaller population (53.7 million) and a population density of only about one-fifth of Bangladesh’s (216 persons per square kilometre). Myanmar has a similar Human Development Index ranking to Bangladesh (145th out of 189 countries), with similar per capita GDP (\$US 1.245) and annual GDP growth rate (5.5 percent). The country is more reliant on the agriculture sector (comprising about 60 percent of the GDP).
7. Bangladesh ranks 134th on the Gender Inequality Index (GII), while Myanmar ranks 106th.⁸ In both countries, many of the inequalities are a result of extreme poverty and traditional gender norms centred on deep-rooted patriarchy and a patrilineal kinship system. However, in both countries, there have been positive gender equality developments, including improvements in the Gender Inequality Index and Gender Development Index since 2012, as well as improved enrolment ratios in education and adaptations to the legal frameworks.⁹ There have been considerable gains in gender equality in Bangladesh in the past 20 years as a result of the growth of the garment industry and the presence of large national NGOs that have promoted ongoing social norm changes, and this has led to substantive shifts in the conditions of women, girls, and transgender populations.¹⁰
8. The two countries demarcate the transition between South Asian demographics and South-east Asian demographics. In Bangladesh, the majority of the population is Muslim (89 percent), with a significant proportion that is Hindu (11 percent).¹¹ In Myanmar, by contrast, the majority of the population is Buddhist (80 percent), and only 4 percent of the population are Muslim. The Rohingya people of Myanmar are among those who are Muslim.¹² The Rohingya are effectively stateless due to the 1982 citizenship legislation in Myanmar that defined the Rohingya as illegal immigrants who arrived during the British colonial era from South Asia. Rohingya in Myanmar are considered “resident foreigners”.¹³

⁴ This section provides a short overview of the country context and the humanitarian response. GEEWG-related initiatives are integrated into the sections on the findings.

⁵ UNDP, 2013.

⁶ Bangladesh Planning Commission Annual Report, 2014.

⁷ World Bank, Annual Report, 2013.

⁸ Human Development Report, 2017, UNDP.

⁹ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BGD> & <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MMR>.

¹⁰ For example, maternal mortality rates have dropped from 432 deaths per 100,000 persons per year in 1998 to 173 deaths per 100,000 persons per year in 2017 (WHO Country Profiles).

¹¹ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, November 2019.

¹² PEW Research Centre: Burma, 2010.

¹³ <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/people/reference/rohingya-people/>

The Rohingya Humanitarian Response

9. Over the decades, periodic religious and legal tensions have resulted in targeted violence in Rakhine State of Myanmar, forcing Rohingya into Bangladesh over many decades. At the start of 2017, there were 30,000 official Rohingya refugees, with an additional estimated 300,000 undocumented displaced Rohingya living in Bangladesh.¹⁴ In August 2017, renewed violence and attacks on Rohingya in Myanmar resulted in more than 670,000 persons fleeing to Bangladesh, more than tripling the population of Rohingya with the country. The District of Cox's Bazar has been the epicentre of the influx, and the majority of Rohingya refugees are housed in 34 formally established camps within the municipality. At the onset of the influx, there were only five UN agencies, five INGOs, and a network of national NGOs authorized by the government to operate in Cox's Bazar to support the refugees. The speed and scale of the influx required a rapid scale-up of the humanitarian response with the 2019 JRP listing 50 UN agencies and INGOs under the JRP.
10. One important contextual dynamic is that the Government of Bangladesh has played an increasing leadership role in responding to emergencies. Bangladesh is one of the more disaster-prone countries in the world, and the increased economic growth and development in Bangladesh over the past 20 years has led to the government playing a more prominent role in managing responses. The capacity to respond has also increased over time; the country has been subject to multiple natural disasters over the past 30 years, which has led to an increased build-up in terms of national response. The humanitarian architecture for the response is shaped by some particular political and legislative realities within the context.
11. The humanitarian assistance stakeholders are organized under a Strategic Executive Group (SEG) in Dhaka to support the Government of Bangladesh actions spearheaded by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and a National Task Force chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The SEG is co-chaired by the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Representative and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Chief of Mission. In Cox's Bazar, the implementation of the response is coordinated by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG).¹⁵ The Senior Coordinator is supported by the ISCG secretariat (which includes IM, communication, external relations, field coordination and four thematic unit: Gender Hub, PSEA, Transfers and Emergency Preparedness). In addition to ten sectors (health, education, and so forth) and two sub-sectors, there are six Inter-Sector Working Groups, of which one is the Gender in Humanitarian Action (GIHA) Working Group.¹⁶ The amount of funding requested annually for the Rohingya response is over \$US 900 million, of which about 70 percent is funded.¹⁷
12. In Cox's Bazar, Rohingya women and girls in the camps experience restrictions on movements within the larger conservative social environment, and many women and girls are confined to their shelters, limiting access to relief items, services, and other resources. This conservative environment of pre-existing cultural norms and practices (such as purdah) and gender dynamics has been further exacerbated by the high levels of sexual and gender-based violence women and girls experienced in Myanmar, and which is seen as an increasing risk in the camps. The nature of gender dynamics has changed for Rohingya women over the history of the influx. A gender analysis carried out in August 2018 noted that the gender norms for Rohingya women coming from Myanmar have become more conservative in the context of the camps than in their country of origin. The nature of the risk of exploitation has also changed. A Rapid Gender Analysis conducted by CARE in 2017¹⁸ found that every interviewed woman and girl had been either a survivor of sexual assault or a witness to sexual assault in Myanmar, but that they felt safer in the camps in Bangladesh. However,

¹⁴ UNFPA Country Programme Evaluation, 2016.

¹⁵ Six agencies are on the ISCG: UNHCR, WFP, WHO, IOM, UNICEF, and UN Women

¹⁶ The Rohingya response architecture is presented visually in Annex 5.

¹⁷ US\$ 950.8 million in 2018, of which 69 percent was funded, and US\$ 921 million in 2019.

¹⁸ CARE, Rapid Gender Analysis, September 2017.

subsequent reports have shown increasing vulnerability of women to gender-based violence (GBV) in the camps; in addition, new gender inequality vulnerabilities such as early marriage, polygamy, and trafficking are becoming more prevalent.¹⁹ Despite these many barriers, Rohingya women have emerged as leaders, forming their own CBOs in camps through which they deliver critical services to other women and girls (GBV, education, skill training, etc). Rohingya women have been elected as camp block representatives, working as volunteers in all sectors such as livelihoods and cash for work activities among other initiatives as well.

¹⁹ Joint Agency Research Report, Rohingya Refugee Response Gender Analysis, August 2018, OXFAM, Save the Children, and Action against Hunger.

3. Findings

13. The considerations highlighted here provide a snapshot of the most common issues related to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in the Rohingya humanitarian response activities, as elicited from key informant interviews and a targeted literature review.²⁰ Findings are also compared against the global reports from UN Women and UNFPA, including the 2018 *IASC Gender Policy Accountability Framework Report*,²¹ which marks the first monitoring cycle of the 2017 IASC Gender Policy, and the *Funding for Women and Girls in Humanitarian Crises* study²² which used Bangladesh as a case study country.
14. The following narrative is organized around the four key evaluation questions and relevant sub-themes. Annex 3 presents a summary evidence table aligned with the overall IAHE GEEWG evaluation matrix. Observations regarding systemic challenges and opportunities for GEEWG consideration are integrated into the summary observations section.

3.1 Evaluation Question 1: Relevance²³

To what extent are humanitarian responses tailored to build the capacities and resilience of women, girls, men, and boys?

Gender Analysis²⁴

15. The abruptness and scale of the Rohingya influx in 2017 and the relatively minimal humanitarian architecture in place in Cox's Bazar strained the capacity of the humanitarian actors to provide the required assistance in a timely manner. Respondents reported that, at the time, the emphasis was primarily on lifesaving approaches, and gender equality considerations were variably applied. A pre-influx gender analysis was used to guide some planning in the initial assistance, but new gender analyses tended to occur after the initial surge among the sectors, as a cross-cutting theme.²⁵ The first JRP for 2017 reflects this minimal integration of gender equality considerations.²⁶ Each sector provided a paragraph description on gender, age, and disability considerations, but with minimal description of how these considerations shaped the response. Few of the indicators in the 2017 JRP's

²⁰ Unless otherwise indicated in the narrative itself, findings reported from respondents are the triangulated composites from multiple interview sources. Single subject observations that could not be confirmed from other interviews were excluded.

²¹ The report was produced by UN Women on behalf of the IASC Reference Group for Gender in Humanitarian Action and combined data from various sources, including direct contributions from 25 country contexts, 9 of which are also considered under the current IAHE GEEWG. Bangladesh is the only country among those selected as a case study for the IAHE that has not contributed information.

²² Funded by UNFPA and UN Women.

²³ The sub-dimensions under this EQ1 focus on the elements of affected population participation, accountability mechanisms, the degree to which response activities are tailored to the needs of the different groups, and the degree to which SADD is integrated into assessments, reporting, and analysis. For purposes of synthesis in this summary, some of these concepts are combined in the narrative. The evidence matrix in Annex 3 provides further individual details for each sub-dimension.

²⁴ This section combines tailoring of responses and SADD consideration.

²⁵ Gender analyses were carried out by individual organizations and not part of an inter-agency coordination. Care and Oxfam were the two most commonly cited organizations.

²⁶ Due to the particularities of the definition of the Rohingya response and the overall humanitarian and development architecture, the humanitarian response plans for the Rohingya response are termed Joint Response Plans (JRPs) rather than Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs). The first plan was called the Humanitarian Response plan and was released Oct 2017, for the Sept 2017-Feb 2018 period.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_HRP_Bangladesh_041017_2.pdfhttps://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2017_HRP_Bangladesh_041017_2.pdf

performance monitoring framework described SADD conditions, and none of the targets included SADD parameters.²⁷

16. Donor, agency, and sector evaluations²⁸ of that time highlighted a number of instances where this led to activities and infrastructure not well tailored to the different needs of the affected populations. A frequently cited example from respondent interviews was the construction of WASH facilities as communal services, despite IASC guidelines on Gender and WASH and the WASH Cluster Minimum Commitments. This prevented women from accessing the facilities due to social and cultural norms.²⁹ The WASH sector audit also cited challenges for access by those who were disabled and required assistance.
17. Respondents noted that although the quality of gender sensitivity in the initial response was low, it improved considerably over time. This is due in part to the common dynamic (even among gender focal points) that “we were first focused on lifesaving, and then when we had time, we were able to include more gender considerations”. However, gender experts warn that failing to include gender considerations from the very outset of response can skew “whose lives are saved” during initial phases.
18. The subsequent JRPs reflect more integration of gender equality considerations, and actions for building these JRPs included more gender-focused analyses. Respondents noted that the multi-sector needs assessment carried out in early 2018 was important for bringing additional gender sensitivity to the planned activities. Gender reviews were carried out in October 2017 (UN Women), December 2017 (GIHA), August 2018 (Oxfam), and September 2019 (Women’s Refugee Commission). These collective reviews are considered by respondents to have informed adjustments within the subsequent JRPs.
19. The Rohingya crisis is considered to have substantive gender implications in the sense that the influx population is heavily weighted towards women and children, and the history of sexual violence against the Rohingya women and mass violence against the population in Myanmar was considered to be a primary driver of the influx. Because of this, the protection sector assumes great prominence in the response, with protection elements integrated into all of the other sectors, as well as standing as a separate sector in its own right. One dynamic noted by respondents is that the degree of gender integration into sector activities can be limited by the degree to which gender is conflated with protection – particularly GBV and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). Respondents noted that when gender is seen as meaning GBV and protection, then there was a tendency for actors to only consider protection issues and to stop looking for other ways in which GEEWG could be operationalized in the activities.
20. In terms of the capacities for gender equality programming within the response, a number of resources exist for capacity strengthening. The first GenCap deployment was October 2017 in the form of extended mission of Dhaka-based GenCap supporting the Humanitarian County Task Team to CXB. This GenCap was officially reassigned to CXB from Feb 2018 to support capacity strengthening on GEEWG in the response, and the GIHA Working Group was established in October 2017. A Gender Hub (GH) pilot project supported by Canada was established in March 2019 as a three-year project until March 2022. The GH is a team of five full-time staff, including four gender specialists (although one has not yet come fully on board, expected June 1st) sitting at the level of the ISCG Secretariat who are commissioned to provide additional technical support, along with sector gender focal points and the GIHA Working Group. The GH has its own dedicated budget for capacity-building activities and is

²⁷ Joint Response Plan, October 2017. See also the CARE Rapid Gender Analysis completed in Sept 2017. The first Gender Profile was released in Dec 2017. <https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/12/the-gender-profile-for-the-rohingya-refugee-crisis-response>

²⁸ See for example: Response to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (Australian Humanitarian Partnership, February 2019), Cox’s Bazar Humanity in WASH Sector Audit (March 2019), or Evaluation of UNICEF’s Response to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis in Bangladesh (November 2018).

²⁹ Additional security issues related to risks associated with accessing facilities after dark were also cited.

a two-year project. The GH in particular was cited by respondents as a very important resource, and was considered to fill gaps on four different levels: influence (sitting at the ISCG Secretariat), expertise (full-time focus of gender experts), resourcing (available dedicated budget for capacity development and gender analysis), and timing (longer-term project of three years versus the often standard six-month deployments). The project is managed by UNW.

Engagement with Affected Populations³⁰

21. Respondents claimed that, at the inception of the influx, consultations were carried out under extreme time pressure, which limited the degree to which GEEWG considerations could be integrated into the first responses – frequently mentioning that the initial response was focused on “lifesaving” activities first, and then after stabilization, consultation processes were expanded to be more inclusive. Various needs assessments carried out by different sectors tended to consult the same stakeholders – typically Rohingya traditional or religious leaders, usually men. These consultations may have been insufficiently diverse and inclined towards data extraction as opposed to dialogue. Consultations tended to be biased as well in that gender issues were consulted with women, but not with men. There were observations that men and religious leaders have not been sufficiently engaged in gender norms issues and GBV.
22. Approaches for consultation on and inclusion of GEEWG considerations have improved over time. Many agencies and sectors had established a network of female volunteers for both information dissemination and consultation. Multiple respondents cited one project³¹ that involved an effort to improve gender responsiveness by increasing women’s representation among the elected leaders for camp governance. The agencies also reported self-organizing Rohingya women’s groups, with efforts to recognize and support these groups for increased gender responsiveness. Among the sectors, the involvement of volunteer women’s groups was seen as empowering, and the women volunteers themselves reported increased self-esteem through their contributions to sector activities.
23. The complaint mechanisms for the sector activities fall entirely under the purview of site management, which hosts offices in all the camps. Complaints about any sector activities are to be collected and then channelled to sector representatives in the camps for redress. When a complaint booth is managed by a man (as the overwhelming majority are), women are less likely to lodge complaints. Some respondents perceived adding women to the booth staff as a positive adjustment, allowing women to talk to women regarding complaints. The nature of complaints was assumed to be more oriented towards failure of delivery of services rather than complaints regarding PSEA or GBV – highlighting something of a blind spot in camp management in that SEA complaints were being channeled through a mechanism that was more challenging to access by women. As a consequence, SEA complaints were often transmitted informally by women through women leaders who were seen as connected to the INGOs and UN agencies. Regardless, there is limited evidence of follow-up or resolution of complaints. Another project piloted the placement of six female gender officers, UNW staff seconded to the Camp-in-Charge (CiC) offices in 13 camps, but these gender officers were only recently deployed in 2020, and it is not possible to determine impact yet. However, the intent is to promote improved gender sensitivity in camp management. In relation to Government deployments, originally the deployed CiCs were all men, but in the past year, there have been two female assistant CiCs deployed by the Government (in addition to the female gender officers who would support the CiC).
24. A number of gaps in coverage stem from a narrower view of gender, as well as the social and cultural limitations placed on women. This affected multiple categories of women in different ways from female staff of agencies to women volunteers in camps to women beneficiaries and are reflective of larger social norms. For example, harassment of women volunteers and

³⁰ This section combines the sub-dimensions of accountability mechanisms and participation.

³¹ UN Women project for the promotion of women in governance

female staff has been reduced through promotion of awareness and acceptance among religious leaders, but unmarried or young married women are still more restricted than married women in their 30s, and elderly women are often not included in project implementation. Few women’s organizations were identified during a mapping exercise, and their involvement tends to be in implementation rather than design or decision making.³² Dimensions of age, disability, ethnicity, men, or LGBTI persons are generally under-addressed. For example, sexual violence is considered to be a primary driver of the influx; however, it was only at the end of 2018 that a study was carried out to understand the degree to which men and boys had also been victims of sexual violence.³³ As a consequence, a UN Women and IOM study recommended increased emphasis on social norms programming.³⁴

3.2 Evaluation Question 2: Coherence³⁵

How consistently are existing system-wide policies, programme guidance, and tools on gender implemented among IASC members?

Alignment with Existing Policy Frameworks³⁶

25. A gender review carried out by the Gender Hub in September 2019 concluded that the humanitarian response is based on the IASC Policy and Accountability Framework on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls in Humanitarian Action, and that the JRPs are aligned with the Protection Framework and its four pillars. A gender strategy specific to the Rohingya response has been elaborated and is referenced in the JRPs. Although lacking in the 2017 HRP, the JRPs in 2018 and 2019 describe the different needs, capacities, and vulnerabilities of diverse groups, and recognize that protection and gender equality should be mainstreamed as a priority for all sectors. The Rohingya response served as a case study for the piloting of the revised IASC Gender Handbook, with tools piloted in the response providing widespread availability of IASC gender-related tools. A Gender with Age Marker (GAM) analysis as part of the UNFPA and UN Women study on gender funding found that 74 percent of the 2019 JRP project plans would significantly contribute to gender equality, including across age groups.
26. In April of 2018, the document Gender Equality Commitments: Key Actions on GEEWG in Humanitarian Action was prepared by the GiHA WG and endorsed by SEG co-chairs. The commitments were based on the IASC Gender Policy and Accountability Framework and outlined a series of six commitments that each agency would pursue in the response: a) collect, analyse, and use disaggregated data on gender and age diversity; b) support women’s economic empowerment; c) ensure leadership and meaningful participation of women and other marginalized groups in the overall response; d) prevent, mitigate, and respond to GBV and PSEA; e) support capacity development of government and civil society organizations on GEEWG; and f) provide financial resources for GEEWG programming. The document was endorsed by the SEG, and the commitments were mainstreamed into the 2019 JRP. A year-end review of these commitments noted progress towards the achievement

³² BRAC is a major national NGO with a strong reputation for addressing gender issues; they were heavily involved in the response and affirmed for their commitment to gender equality programming and inclusions. However, they are not specifically considered to be a women’s organization and are often categorized as an INGO because of their multi-country coverage.

³³ Women’s Refugee Commission, November 2018, Sexual Violence against Rohingya Men and Boys.

³⁴ <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/bangladesh/document/honour-transition-changing-gender-norms-among-rohingya-consultation>

³⁵ The sub-dimensions under this EQ2 focus on the elements of inter-agency alignment with policies, the consistent application of the policies and tools, leadership commitment, and the fulfillment of roles and responsibilities. For purposes of synthesis in this summary, some of these concepts are combined in the narrative. The evidence matrix in Annex 3 provides further individual details for each sub-dimension.

³⁶ Combines the sub-dimensions of roles and responsibilities and policy alignment.

of the commitments within the 2019 JRP, but also highlighted that more progress is needed to reach these commitments.³⁷

27. The 2019 JRP includes more details of sector-specific GEEWG considerations, and the performance-monitoring framework is more explicit in describing SADD targets for all indicators. Respondents reported that the 2020 JRP is even more gender sensitive due to substantive advocacy efforts from the GIHA Working Group and the Gender Hub.³⁸ The sector strategies described in the 2020 JRP are purportedly more elaborated with gender-sensitive considerations. More gender-specific indicators are included in the 2020 JRP, although some respondents noted that these are insufficient to track gender empowerment.³⁹ The Bangladesh study is a very good example of the added advantage of technical gender expertise.
28. By 2019, the GIHA Working Group reactivated the Sector Gender Focal Point system, initially established in September 2017, to support the nomination of at least one gender focal point within each sector for gender mainstreaming in sector activities although many have more than one. However, respondents noted that while these focal points may have sector technical expertise, they often lack the requisite gender expertise, limiting their ability to fully influence key decision making and to apply gender considerations in their specific sectors. In addition, their work as gender focal points is voluntary, without specific time allocated or dedicated to this work. Respondents noted that the appointment of sector-specific gender advisors could mitigate the pressure on gender focal points, except that advisors are inconsistently deployed in the Rohingya response. These advisors may provide specific support in the elaboration of a concept paper or programme design, but usually are on short-term contracts and are highly mobile among global responses. This trend exacerbates pressure on the gender focal points rather than easing it.
29. IASC gender tools and guidelines are available and known within the response, although their application and understanding varied. The GAM assessment tool is an example of this dynamic. The GAM exercise is intended to be primarily a reflection and assessment tool to promote thinking on inclusion and differential needs in project design. Seventy-four percent of the project proposals presented in the 2019 JRP were self-rated at the highest score in the GAM. However, a review carried out as part of the UNFPA and UN Women study on gender funding found that the average GAM scores reported in the JRP were over-reported by a factor of 25 percent compared to the results generated on the GAM assessment tool.⁴⁰ There were divergent understandings among interviewed respondents regarding how the GAM was intended to be used. Although gender focal points and GIHA members described the GAM as a self-assessment tool for mainstreaming gender within projects, some technical partners had the impression that their funding would be tied to their GAM score (which may have contributed to the over-reporting of scores). Donor representatives also described varying degrees of importance they place on GAM scores in reviewing project proposals. Some donors noted that they pay special attention to the GAM scores in project proposals, while others said that they do not consider the GAM scores when reviewing the project proposals. National implementing partners observed that even though it was required that all projects included in the JRP have a GAM score, the GAM tool had not yet been translated into Bangla, which also limited the degree to which it could be used correctly by the implementing partners.
30. The IASC Gender Handbook in particular is a known resource for guiding gender-responsive programming at the field level. However, respondents consistently cited challenges in contextualizing the available tools for use in the field-level implementation (a frequent theme in the interviews). Specific sector tip sheets and checklists have been developed by the GIHA and GH for field-level personnel to use in implementation, despite concerns that this could

³⁷ Gender Response Reflections: Two Years of the Rohingya Refugee Response, September 2019, Gender Hub.

³⁸ The 2020 JRP is outside of the time period under review in this exercise, but a noteworthy finding.

³⁹ Some respondents noted that gender empowerment is assumed to be a side effect of best practice programming rather than a targeted intervention in itself, which may have limited the degree to which these indicators were considered.

⁴⁰ Funding for Women and Girls in Humanitarian Crises – Bangladesh Case Study (UNFPA/UN Women, 2020).

lead to a formulaic response to gender mainstreaming in sector activities. However, it was also recognized that field-level sector personnel are expected to be familiar with and respond to multiple cross-cutting themes simultaneously and need to be equipped to do so.

31. Respondents noted that the consistency of reporting against SADD indicators has improved over time, although it is still highly variable between the sectors and among the agencies. The primary factor in the variation cited by respondents was the degree to which specific leaders or managers prioritized gender equality programming and reporting – implying that sector and agency performance is highly “personality dependent”⁴¹ (rather than process dependent, for example). Because of the high turnover of personnel, this means that specific sectors and agencies may perform quite differently in different years depending on the particular individual in the position at the time. SADD appears to be used primarily for initial needs assessment or project design, and for reporting. There is limited evidence of the use of SADD for monitoring, implementation adjustment, or trend analysis over time. SADD is focused primarily on women and girls, and the needs of other groups, such as men and boys, the elderly, certain ethnic groups, or persons with disability, are not yet considered or reported on systematically.

Leadership Contribution to Coherent Approach

32. Respondents noted that the RC is seen as a gender champion and that the gender equality commitments endorsed by SEG cochairs can serve as an accountability framework for gender-sensitive programming. Agencies supported the work of the GenCap to integrate gender analysis into needs assessments for sectors linked to the JRP. The leadership also greenlighted the Rohingya response for final pre-testing of the IASC Gender Handbook and the final testing of GAM.
33. However, even with these leadership commitments, respondents expressed some scepticism regarding the full degree of leadership commitment to gender equality programming, citing shortfalls in practice. For example, gender is not a standing item on the SEG agenda, nor in the sector coordinator meetings or in the Heads of Sub-Agencies meetings. Meanwhile, although GBV is recognized as a priority, the bulk of activities target case management rather than balancing this work with risk mitigation through addressing root causes/prevention strategies, which should be a concerted strategic effort shared by all sectors.
34. Furthermore, respondents observed that there are limited consequences to compliance or non-compliance with gender equality programming, which means that compliance becomes “personality dependent” among the many actors and stakeholders within the Rohingya response. There is a relatively sensitive chain of command to implement gender equality programming. Commitments and policies may exist at the highest levels, but the actual operationalization of gender equality programming is dependent on an entire chain from strategic leadership to operational leadership to implementing partners to field-level camp personnel. Lack of compliance at any point in this chain can impede gender programming from being realized with the affected populations.
35. Some respondents also noted that the issue of leadership commitment extended beyond the specifics of the Rohingya response. For example, the standard operating procedures for humanitarian response do not involve the establishment of GiHA WG, nor deployment of gender specialists at the front line of any response, but only after an initial response has been stabilized. This creates two unintended consequences for gender mainstreaming: first, it sends the message that gender is a secondary consideration. When combined with a lack of consequences for non-compliance with gender commitments, this minimizes prioritization of gender mainstreaming. Second, when gender specialists are deployed later, they must integrate into pre-existing teams and can be seen as outsiders criticizing the work of the sectors and creating extra work for everyone. At the same time, they may be seen as the sole individuals to be relied upon for all work related to gender. In essence, respondents noted

⁴¹ Direct quote from four different KIIs

that the degree of operationalization of GEEWG is still highly dependent on individuals rather than as an element that is routinely systematized in all operations.

3.3 Evaluation Question 3: Effectiveness⁴²

How effective are existing IASC-promoted efforts to strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in humanitarian programming?

36. Inter-agency resourcing related to strengthening gender equality programming included the deployment of a GenCap to the Rohingya response in September 2017. The original GenCap ToR was for six months, but this was periodically extended every six months for two years. The piloting of the GH project began in March 2019 with the GenCap as the interim head of the GH. The Rohingya response has piloted a number of initiatives on gender equality and gender-based violence. As noted, Bangladesh was a case study country in the development of the IASC Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action, with tools and resources piloted in the response. The Gender with Age Marker was also piloted in 2018 in the new JRP. More recent rollouts include the 2019 *Handbook for Coordinating Gender-based Violence Interventions in Emergencies* and the 2019 *Inter-Agency Minimum Standards for Gender-based Violence in Emergencies Programming*. The Rohingya response in Bangladesh also served as one of the case study countries for the UNFPA- and UN Women-sponsored study on the funding of GEEWG programming in humanitarian response.

Capacity Development on Gender⁴³

37. From the beginning of the response, capacity was institutionalized by the deployment of the GenCap and the formation of the GIHA Working Group. Then agencies began to appoint gender focal points to support these, followed by the formation of the GH and the elaboration of sectoral gender focal points. The GenCap, GIHA, GH, and various IASC member agencies continue to lead ongoing gender capacity development for gender analysis, SADD analysis, etc.
38. In mid-2019, a gender capacity learning assessment carried out by Gender Hub⁴⁴ noted that although UN agencies and most INGOs have gender policies and strategies in place to guide their activities, in practice they are often limited in effectiveness due to the low understanding and limited gender expertise of individual staff and implementing partners. The UN agencies, INGOs, and larger national NGOs may have more exposure to capacity development opportunities and to donor-sponsored capacity initiatives, but the most sensitive point in the chain of mechanisms from the IASC level to the operationalization of GEEWG in humanitarian activities in the camps is the limited opportunities available to the local implementing partner staff for this type of capacity development⁴⁵ and accessing training. This has led to challenges in analysing gender dynamics within implementing partners' work and in creating a systematic analysis of SADD. The capacity assessment report also noted that among the four capacities,⁴⁶ the least developed were gender analysis and strategic planning. Although capacity for partnerships and advocacy was relatively well developed, gender was not necessarily a central issue for these stronger areas.
39. Capacity development training needs for GEEWG were seen by respondents as two-fold. First, the short-term nature of the international deployments combined with rapid transitions

⁴² Sub-dimensions under the effectiveness EQ include capacities, processes, funding, and staff for carrying out gender-responsive programming.

⁴³ Capacity development within the evaluation matrix involves: 1) Gender analysis and strategic planning, 2) gender responsive and transformative programming, 3) Gender responsive M&E and knowledge management; 4) Partnerships and Advocacy for GEEWG

⁴⁴ Gender Capacity Learning Assessment Inter-Cluster, 2019

⁴⁵ On all four dimensions

⁴⁶ 1) Gender analysis and strategic planning, 2) gender responsive and transformative programming, 3) Gender responsive M&E and knowledge management; 4) Partnerships and Advocacy for GEEWG

among national staff has presented challenges for maintaining GEEWG capacity among the humanitarian actors. This type of turnover has required ongoing basic capacity-strengthening efforts. At the same time, while these introductory trainings were important, they were not considered sufficient to provide deeper expertise. In order to put learning from a two-day training into practice, ongoing mentoring and coaching was required for individual participants. Further, respondents noted that the capacity development needed to be built on a foundation and deepened. Trainings and capacity development sessions were perceived by respondents to be isolated “one-off” types of trainings rather than fitting into an ongoing curriculum – limiting the potential for stakeholders to build on and increase their capacity in GEEWG over a longer period of time. One factor noted by respondents for this pattern is that they claimed that humanitarian response funding cycles are usually based on six-month or one-year time frames for funding cycles, which discourages the formulation of a longer-term curriculum for capacity development.⁴⁷ The two-year cycle of the GH presents an opportunity to install a longer-term curriculum in capacity development.

40. One systemic constraint noted by respondents was the difficulty in building a long-term programming and capacity-strengthening curriculum within the time frame of short-term cycles of engagement. The Rohingya situation has been a long-term chronic responses covering multiple years even before the influx in 2017. However, projects and ToR for engagement are often very short term in nature, covering six months or one year. The GenCap ToR, for example, is typically renewed every six months for two years, rather than developing ToR for capacity building that would assume a two-year cycle from the beginning. One of the reasons respondents were so positive about the GH is that it was explicitly developed as a two-year programme from its inception – allowing for a longer-term time frame for activities and development.
41. The same dynamic was noted for the gender-targeted programming as well. Multiple agency and sector evaluations noted the importance of instituting longer-term programming for women’s empowerment, the need for long-term support⁴⁸ to women-led civil society organizations and the need to promote women’s self-organization.
42. Respondents also observed that long-term capacity development for gender was inhibited by the lack of inter-agency spaces for learning from evaluations.⁴⁹ Individual agency evaluations were carried out, but there was limited broader dissemination of lessons learned and transparency regarding impacts and results across agencies. Part of the Gender Hub’s mandate is on knowledge management which includes sharing lessons learned. Learning and advocacy events have been organized, though this has since been put on hold due to COVID-19 so it is unclear to what extent this was useful. Respondents noted that there was excessive reliance on an informal network of allies sharing anecdotal processes, as well as a missed opportunity to learn from and adapt other refugee responses globally.
43. Capacity development on gender is further complicated by the reliance on junior personnel in agencies who are focal points but not gender experts. Although the UN SWAP indicators mandate that gender focal points should be at the P-4 level and above, there were few, if any, focal points in the Rohingya response with that level of seniority. In addition to their limited ability to influence decision making, the more junior levels also imply reduced capabilities for capacity-strengthening activities and suggest the need for the focal points to be recipients of greater capacity-strengthening efforts. Even with greater seniority, staff turnover patterns inhibit institutionalization in programming for example.

⁴⁷ For example, GenCap ToRs are based on a six-month deployment.

⁴⁸ in terms of technical capacity building, inclusion in decision making bodies, and financial support

⁴⁹ See for example, Response to the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis (Australian Humanitarian Partnership, February 2019), and the Gender Operational Review Report (WRC, September 2019).

SADD Monitoring, Reporting, and Analysis

44. The gender capacity assessment noted that GEEWG indicators are being monitored through the 2019 JRP, and gender equality–related indicators can be found, albeit to varying degrees, in each sector. The GIHA and GH, as well as the gender focal points, provide technical support for assessment, monitoring, and analysis. Respondents reported that most implementing partners and projects do report gender-disaggregated data. However, as was mentioned earlier, it is much less evidence that SADD is used in monitoring or analysis, and it is recognized the SADD reporting is highly variable due to limited accountability for non-compliance. Thus, even though the mechanisms are in place for ensuring SADD monitoring at the JRP level, there appears to be a capacity gap limiting their actual use. If staff do not have the training to collect this data or do not see the usefulness in its collection, there are limited incentives to motivate organizations to find ways to collect the data or build the capacity for doing so. Gender and inclusion were more prominent in the design phase of projects and needs assessments, but less considered during implementation, monitoring or analysis, with limited detailed trend analysis of 4W and 5W reports.⁵⁰
45. Respondents noted that there had been a planned initiative in 2020 to do more multi-sectoral monitoring, with experts from multiple sectors – including gender – working together on a monitoring exercise to ensure that the cross-cutting themes were better integrated and used for analysis. However, these plans were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and it is not certain when they will be able to be piloted.

Funding for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls in the Rohingya Response

46. The Rohingya response is considered by respondents to be relatively well funded for gender equality, although the precise amount of funding allocated for gender programming cannot be easily abstracted from the existing financial tracking systems. The UNFPA- and UN Women-sponsored funding study that used Bangladesh as a case study reported that about 70 percent of the requested funding in the 2018 JRP was requested for women and girls. However, the report also noted that only 47 percent of the requested funds for programming related to women and girls was received in 2018 (compared to 69 percent coverage of the entire JRP request). This is a better percentage of requested and received funding compared to other responses, but the report concluded that it is still short of ideal.
47. Funding related to gender capacity development in particular was more visible to respondents. The GH, for example, reflects a donor commitment to institutionalized inter-agency capacity development. Respondents also cited the example of some agencies that required implementing agencies to allocate budgets in proposed projects for the creation of in-house gender expertise. However, one concern expressed was that only a few donors are seen as committed to GEEWG funding; it was felt that many prioritized “hardware”-based outcomes oriented around infrastructure rather than social elements such as empowerment, social norms, and so forth. One respondent observed that when it comes to funding, there is an apparent implicit assumption that gender is something that can be done without a budget and simply “mainstreamed” into other activities.
48. There was an apparent communication gap between donors and implementing agencies regarding donor expectations for gender equality programming. On the one hand, interviewed donor representatives expressed some frustration that even when they felt that they had encouraged agencies and INGOs to be innovative with respect to gender programming, they felt that the presented proposals tended to be reflective of “business as usual” approaches in programming. Interestingly, interviewed agency and INGO representatives at the same time observed that they perceived that donors were not open to innovative gender equality programming and tended to support the more “traditional” types of projects.

⁵⁰ Coordination reports describing which actors are carrying out activities in which places.

3.4 Evaluation Question 4: Coordination⁵¹

To what extent are efforts by IASC members to strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in humanitarian programming coordinated?

49. The coordination of gender-responsive programming and advocacy is primarily led by the GIHA Working Group, with the technical support to sectors and humanitarian agencies led by the GH. The GH receives information on sectoral challenges through GIHA WG members, provides technical input, training and capacity building support to sectors and agencies, reviews projects, JRPs, and so forth, and provides technical assistance. The GH is seen by respondents as an improvement over the GenCap deployment because it is a larger team of persons and has a longer scope and its own dedicated budget. The GH sitting at the level of the ISCG Secretariat is also seen as a positive contribution for coordination and complementarity. Respondents noted that one challenge of the GIHA is that as a working group, its role is influence and negotiation rather than carrying out work independently as the sectors do within the ISCG. Sectors have their own budget and full-time personnel, institutional support (i.e. dedicated coordinator, donors give funding) and they oversee implementation. Working groups do not have full-time personnel, have a limited or non-existent budget, and do not have direct input into implementation. As non-standard mechanisms the establishment of the group must be locally justified and negotiated. The existence of GIHA WG or any kind of gender coordination mechanism is also not established in the IASC sector/cluster system. The GH – with its own budget and influence at the Secretariat – was seen as a positive factor for promoting complementarity and consistent gender-responsive messaging across the multiple sectors.
50. Respondents saw GH support as net positive, despite the difficulty of covering the scope of all gender-responsive programming across all of the sectors. The structure provided an overlapping network of information bodies (PSEA, GBV, Protection, GIHA, and GH, among others), enhancing complementarity. Although this was seen as creating “UN-heavy” representation among the coordinating groups, it allowed for cross-fertilization and mitigated the disruption of personnel transitions. Technical specialists further identified an emergent best practice of an email network of peers, both within the response and connected to other responses, which emerged organically from interactions and connections at regional and global trainings. This networking created a useful forum for consulting on issues, collecting information, and triangulating understandings with other stakeholders.
51. The relationship between the GH and the GIHA has at times been a source of some confusion among the sector representatives. The number of coordinating bodies with gender-related mandates sometimes created an information overload, with tools and inputs on sector implementation coming from multiple sources, leading to a tendency to ignore all the inputs altogether. Respondents did perceive recent improvements in messaging coordination among the various bodies. The COVID-19 pandemic response was cited by respondents as an example of the multiple coordinating groups “pre-coordinating” to provide a single set of inputs on sector strategies.
52. In spite of this progress in coordination, respondents cited ongoing gaps in timely communication and coordination among multiple governmental bodies, agencies, and field-level implementation actors that created challenges for consistent implementation of gender-responsive programming at the field level. Respondents noted that the communication of gender-related strategies from donors to the SEG to the sectors to individual UN agencies to implementing partners and field personnel can take a long time to reach field-level implementation, and that even slight variations in how strategies and standards are communicated can create misinterpretations and misunderstandings. As a result, field-level organizations expressed confusion about their requirements in specific implementation

⁵¹ The Coordination EQ sub-dimensions involve complementarity, communication, and coverage

activities and were also uncertain about whether their inputs or observations regarding the implementation of the activities were taken into consideration higher up the chain.

53. In spite of these gaps, respondents recognized the improved consistency of gender-based analysis of needs, power dynamics, and the roles of diverse groups and stakeholders from mid-2018 onwards. However, some respondents expressed concern that these gains were not sufficiently institutionalized to be sustainable. They noted that these improvements in gender responsiveness came during the stabilization period of the Rohingya response rather than at the point of initial shock. It was observed that if additional pressures commenced, then gender-responsive programming might not be considered to such a degree. As one respondent noted: “If I really push and make myself annoying, then they will integrate gender in their reporting and implementation, but as soon as I stop pushing, it reverts to the ‘standard’ way of doing things.”⁵² The COVID-19 pandemic response in the camps provides an example of this dynamic. There were reported observations from personnel in field agencies that COVID-related reporting had stopped consistently using SADD, and the elaboration of COVID-19 response activities did not always integrate the guidance provided by Gender Hub, GIHA and other groups during the planning period.⁵³

⁵² On COVID-19, please see GIHA WG call for urgent gender actions in Covid 19 response:

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/bangladesh/document/urgent-call-gender-actions-covid-19-response-cox%E2%80%99s-bazar>

⁵³ The 2020 period is technically beyond the mandate of the GEEWG evaluation, but the COVID-19 response was – for obvious reasons – at the forefront of interviewed stakeholders’ minds during the interviews and is thus included as an additional observation.

4. Summary Observations

54. The Rohingya response would appear to contain most of the elements that would be assumed to be necessary for GEEWG programming, including, among others: a) highest-level leadership at the RC is seen as strongly supportive of gender equality programming; b) the presence of a SEG-level gender policy; c) sector-specific tools and tip sheets, guidances, and manuals; d) the deployment of a GenCap; e) an active GIHA Working Group; f) the presence of a Gender Hub pilot; g) nomination of sector gender focal points; and h) gender equality commitments signed by SEG co-chairs in the response. However, even with all of these elements in place, there is still a highly variable integration of gender in the response and highly variable examples of its prioritization among sectors. Respondents tended to cite six systemic barriers that they perceived to be contributing to this degree of variation.
55. **Timing of deployment of gender expertise.** According to humanitarian standard operating procedures, gender specialists were not deployed at the beginning of the response. This sends a message that gender is a secondary consideration, and also creates challenges for subsequent gender specialists to “retrofit” activities for gender-responsive programming. Gender specialists were often cited as having the reputation of “those who come in later and criticize and make more work for us”. The humanitarian coordination structure itself should automatically include a gender coordination mechanism from the beginning.
56. **The chain of strategy and implementation.** There is a myriad of non-gender specialist actors across different sectors and ranging from the highest-level leadership to camp implementation. Consistent gender-responsive programming is currently highly dependent on personal will and interests because of limited mechanisms for institutionalizing GEEWG. Consequently, for full GEEWG operationalization, it would require that all actors at all levels equally prioritize and understand gender-sensitive programming. If one point in the chain does not prioritize, then the subsequent links do not end up integrating these concepts into activities. The long and wide chain also creates additional vulnerability to misunderstanding and miscommunication of core concepts.
57. **Limited consequences for non-compliance.** In conjunction with the long and wide chain of implementation, respondents noted that there are limited consequences for not complying with gender equality principles. Leadership performance reviews rarely include consequences for failures in gender mainstreaming or lack of support for gender-responsive programming. Project implementation is rarely suspended for lack of SADD reporting, SADD monitoring, or SADD analysis. This sends an implicit message that gender considerations are optional and voluntary even if strategies and commitments are in place.⁵⁴ At the very least, stricter minimum requirements from the onset of a project reflected in reports, audits, evaluations, etc. could be implemented.
58. **Variable prioritization of the allocation of resources for gender expertise.** Within agencies, the presence of in-house gender expertise varied considerably. Some agencies had full-time gender specialists, but others only had rotating temporarily deployed personnel. Implementing partners tended to not have in-house gender expertise and even less overall capacity for gender-sensitive programming. Sector gender focal points tended to be non-specialists and junior as well.
59. **Gender as a cross-cutting theme.** GEEWG is recognized as a concept that must be considered across all aspects of a response. However, respondents cited systemic limitations to treating gender as a cross-cutting theme. Cross-cutting themes receive less attention than sectors, and the implementation of a cross-cutting theme depends on non-specialists. One respondent observed that a sector such as health would never hire a technical specialist to implement activities who did not have a health background, but gender implementation is routinely expected to be carried out by personnel with limited gender expertise. There is also

⁵⁴ The application of the UN SWAP indicator on leadership might be useful as a minimum standard in accountability, but this does not seem to be consistently applied in performance reviews.

limited budget available for cross-cutting themes. The presence of gender as a cross-cutting theme to be mainstreamed minimizes the need for stand-alone gender-targeted programming. As one respondent commented, “Mainstreaming gender dilutes its political force.”

60. **Gender as a working group not a sector.** Institutionally, according to respondents in the case study, working groups are seen as having less influence and less budget than sectors. For example, the Protection Sector allows for full-time staff to be allocated to the Sector, along with a dedicated budget for capacity building and implementation of activities. Sectors are seen as operational, overseeing implementation. Working groups are seen as advisory. They have less influence in decision making and less input into the subsequent shaping of activities. Working group participants tend to have multiple roles and thus more divided attention as well.
61. The composite collection of these systemic dynamics sends the message that gender equality is not a priority, but rather a luxury that is considered once things have stabilized and not at the point of “lifesaving”. Another implication of these systemic challenges is that the short-term capacity development model may not be sufficient to create sustainable GEEWG application. With the notable exception of the GH pilot, gender capacity initiatives tend to be oriented to the humanitarian response cycles of six months or perhaps one year. These shorter cycles have less ability to affect that rapid turnover in personnel, and the transitions at all levels and the shorter cycles create barriers to building a longer-term curriculum for gender capacity development for the various sectors.

Annexes

Annex 1: List of Persons Interviewed

Name and Position	Position	Organization
Simon Opolot	Former GenCap Advisor	interagency
Flora Macula	Head of Sub-Office	UN Women
Anita Rani Saha	Clinical Psychologist & Regional Coordinator	Ministry of Women and Children Affairs
Rimu Baidya	Gender Advisor & Food Security Gender Focal Point	WFP
Shamima Akter Jahan	Assistant Camp-in-Charge	RRRC Office
Clementine Novales	Gender Coordinator	Oxfam
Abdul Alim	Head - Humanitarian Response	Action Aid Bangladesh
Ruth Mutua	Gender and Protection Program Coordinator	CARE
Tahrima Akter	Programme Manager, GBV Sector Lead for BRAC & PSEA Focal Point	BRAC
Megan Smith	GBV Operations Officer	IOM
Marie Sophie Pettersson	GiHA co-chair; Gender and Humanitarian Action Program Specialist	UN Women, GiHA WG
Tahmina Parvin	Acting GiHA co-chair and Communicating with Communities Working Group Gender Focal Point	UNHCR, GiHA WG
Roselidah Raphael	Head of Sub-Office	UNFPA
Elisa Cappelletti	PSEA Network Coordinator	ISCG
Tess Dico-Young	Gender Hub Manager	ISCG/UN Women
Shoko Ishikawa	Country Representative	UN Women
Marie Toulemonde	Gender Hub Communication and Knowledge Management Officer	ISCG/UN Women
Paul O'Hagan	Humanitarian Advisor - Rohingya Response	DFID
Daniela Durso	Head of Office	ECHO
Anne Sophie LAENKHOLM	Thematic Expert – Protection & Gender	ECHO
Asma Nagis	Gender Coordinator	OXFAM
Tania Lutfunnessa	Gender focal point - WASH	World Vision
Razia Sultana	Lawyer and human rights activist, founder, and Chairperson of RW Welfare Society	RWWS
Mahila Monwara Khanam	Gender and Child Protection Coordinator	CODEC
Adam Nord	Protection Officer	UNHCR
Fidelis Folifac	WASH Officer	UNHCR
Nodoka Hasegawa	Development nexus	UNHCR
Mukesh Pajapati	Health Sector Coordinator	Health/WHO
Diana Garde	Health Sector SRH officer	Health Sector
Asa Torkelsson	Country Representative	UNFPA
Eiko Narito	Deputy Country Representative	UNFPA

Nazmun Kanam	UN Women Multi-Purpose Women Centre Manager	ActionAid
Shakh Jahidur Rahman	Deputy Project Manager (SGBV Prevention and Risk Mitigation) and Men Engagement Programme	BRAC
Priscilla Tamale	GIHA Co-Chair	UNHCR
Mariangela Adamo	WASH Sector Gender focal point	UNICEF
Shaurabh Sharma	Age and Disability Working Group Chair	HI
Md. Nazmul Haque	Assistant Manager-Coordinator (Rohingya Response)	Bhandu Social Welfare Society
Subrata Kumar Chakrabarty	Livelihoods Officer - Host Communities	UNHCR
Tazreen Jahan	Education Sector Programme Coordinator	Save the Children
Kurdvin Rasool	MHPSS Working Group Co-chair	IOM
Mahbubur Rahman	CwC Working Group Coordinator	Bandhu Social Welfare Society
Ben Noble	Country Director	Translators without Borders
Diana Ceci	Gender and M&E Specialist	World Vision

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Annex 3: Evidence Table Matrix¹

	Indicators	Observations
RELEVANCE		
EQ1: To what extent are humanitarian responses tailored to build the capacities and resilience of women, girls, men, and boys?		
1.1 To what extent do women, girls, men, and boys participate in the design and delivery of humanitarian responses?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of collection and use of SADD to inform programmes. ▪ Evidence of gender analysis informing programmes. ▪ Evidence of programme adjustments being made according to the results of SADD and gender analysis. ▪ Evidence of engagement with diverse populations groups* in joint needs assessments. ▪ Evidence of engagement with diverse populations groups in agency-specific needs assessments. ▪ Evidence of engagement with diverse populations groups in monitoring activities, both collective and agency-specific 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SADD data used in reporting, but limited evidence that it is used in guiding implementation. • Gender analysis developed after initial response although multi-sectoral needs assessment did inform subsequent JRP. • Diverse focus is largely on women and girls. The needs of other groups such as men and boys, age, ethnicity, disability, or LGBT not considered systematically. • Criticism from some donors on lack of consultation with communities – primarily extractive and one-way. • Consultations were carried out but often not gender sensitive at the beginning due to time and scope limitations. Same people consulted by all sectors. Constant revisiting. Some criticism that consultation was largely extractive rather than dialogical at the beginning. This was changed over time, but still progress to be made in dialogical consultations • In the absence of a formalized consultation structure, reliance defaults to informal network of allies and anecdotal processes. Not systematic. • Subtle example of language influencing participation and consultation. Bangladeshi, Chittagonian, Rohingya, English. • At the beginning of the response, consultation with women and girls was limited as there was an emphasis on “saving lives” rather than gender consultation. As a result, a number of elements were implemented that did not sufficiently consider gender needs. The toilets and bathing areas were frequently cited examples from interviews. • Over time, the degree of consultation has improved although there are still criticisms that the consultation is more extractive rather than dialogical. • In most cases, the focus is on women and girls with less consultations with men and boys. Young men’s vulnerabilities and needs are not captured. • There have emerged organically groups of women leaders who have begun to play a more active informal role in the management of camps. There have also been efforts to increase women’s representation in decision making such as the UN Women project for electing women representatives among camp representatives (shifting from using traditional leaders as de facto camp representatives) • <i>Strong women’s groups in the camps, people calling them civil society but they are more community organisations with strong focus on education, very active, best schools in the camps completely run by Rohingya with nothing to do with the International community, this was a missed opportunity.</i> • Recently new camp governance has been initiated. There are camp management committees consisting of 10 members – 6 men and 4 are women. But these 4 women are basically influenced by the male members of the committee and they perform what they are told to. It is more like the men are giving instructions and the women really

¹ This matrix summarizes the key observations triangulated from the key informant interviews. Points in italics are illustrative quotes taken from interviews to provide additional depth. Themes from secondary documentation are mentioned in the narrative, but not included in the evidence matrix.

		<p>do not have a voice, which is quite similar to the 50 reserve seats for MPs in our national parliament. Such a mechanism, she thinks is hindering, rather empowering women. Also, there have been some initiatives to reform the existing Majhi system and include women as Majhi. But this has not yet been very successful.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education, Food Security sectors have well captured the gendered needs of different sections of the Rohingya population. • <i>Community as a whole is involved in the response programs. But it is really difficult to bring women out of their homes. After various efforts, now they are coming out a bit. Two, it is particularly more difficult to bring the adolescent girls out of their home. Their tradition is they will not come outside until they get married. Going outside is also not easy for married young women. Girls are interested, but their families do not allow them to go out.</i> • The opportunities are brought forward by the community members themselves through community spaces if agencies have the time and interest to consult AND LISTEN. The challenge is that many agencies don't do it, either lack of time or resources, and setting up a group for men is more straightforward, for women is more complicated because of societal dynamics (i.e. at the beginning of establishing a group women will say they are not comfortable leaving the house, going to an NGO-owned space, travelling some distance etc and will prefer to use a woman's house as meeting space), and adolescent women even more complicated. It requires time, listening skills, trained staff in agency and partners, and an extra challenge is the government (most official camp authorities are male). • The UNHCR project included extensive outreach initiatives in the run up to the elections in the camps, with consultations with certain numbers of families, then FGDs etc. Sometimes cultural practices work towards gender inclusion. i.e. a man approached UNHCR project and explained that like a family has a mother and a father and they are both needed, also camps need female and male representatives, another one explained that if a male leader gets a call from a man in the middle of the night he can help but if it's from a woman he will need to mobilise other women, so women leaders are needed to deal with women issues. • Looking at the big picture you need so many factors : own staff, partners staff facilitating discussions... In UNHCR we use our AGD Mainstreaming handbook, and in Protection and UNHCR this is well incorporated in standard community engagement, Shelter, WASH, Protection trainings, then put it in practice in a systematic way is a challenge, no reference to global tools • One thing we've really seen is that space provided (physical, structural like quota system or designated days for women in a centre, temporal i.e. meeting facilitator pays attention to men's talking time vs women's time), women will take these roles, come to those spaces, speak out. Even in a group only with women not all will be so ready to speak out. They know who they trust, that becomes an enabling factor. You cannot approach it expecting everyone will speak out equally, group dynamics matter. Challenge : conservative norms, a colleague doing outreach to religious leaders relates to cultural awareness, able to draw out protective elements you can start on common ground and move to more complicated areas of discussion. Key for success is seeing these opportunities to engage with them. And listening to them about who in the community is comfortable engaging, how, etc. • <i>We have seen the Rohingya women become more assertive and empowered – self organizing. Was going through a good transition.</i> • But the transition occurred mostly due to facilitation of humanitarian actors working in the response.
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<p>1.2 To what extent do women, girls, men, and boys have access to and benefit from accountability mechanisms?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of efforts to establish a process for feedback/complaints for all population groups. ▪ Evidence of all relevant population groups being informed about accountability mechanisms. ▪ Evidence of accountability mechanisms being accessible to all population groups. ▪ Evidence of accountability mechanisms being used by all population groups. ▪ Evidence of feedback from all relevant population groups being used to inform programmes. ▪ Evidence of feedback loop with affected populations being established. ▪ Evidence of coordination efforts on accountability to affected populations. ▪ Evidence of capacity of staff and organization to manage accountability mechanisms, including on sensitive issues (e.g. SEA, GBV, etc.). ▪ Evidence of action by senior decision makers on the information received. ▪ Evidence of all relevant population groups' satisfaction with accountability mechanisms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complaint mechanism. Most frequently cited is that Site Management has a complaint booth and that people go there. Site Management then coordinates and shares the cases with the respective sectors. • One innovation was to have the complaint booth staffed by one man and one woman to allow for women to be able to talk to a woman about any complaints. • Criticism from some donors on lack of consultation with communities – primarily extractive and one-way. • Consultations were carried out but often not gender sensitive at the beginning due to time and scope limitations. Same people consulted by all sectors. Constant revisiting. Some criticism that consultation was largely extractive rather than dialogical at the beginning. This was changed over time, but still progress to be made in dialogical consultations • In the absence of a formalized consultation structure, reliance defaults to an informal network of allies and anecdotal processes. Not systematic. • One gap – bringing in Bangladeshi women's organizations into the response. Tried to map but hard to find. Response dominated by big INGOs or NNGOs that are not women led, gender sensitive. • Five gender officers placed in CiC offices. To be a source of support and consultation for women's issues and to support CiC leadership for gender sensitivity. • PSEA Network for Cox Bazar coordinating all PSEA partners including UN agencies International and national ones, 39 in total, set up in October 2017. The network was set up under auspices of Resident Coordinator, Cox's bazar is hybrid response with intersectoral coordination group, so I report to senior coordinator and dotted line to resident coordinator in Dhaka. Reporting lines are very strong and valuable.
<p>1.3 To what extent are different means to foster participation effective?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of consultations being held with diverse population groups across the phases of the programme cycle. ▪ Evidence of efforts to define (multiple/different) ways of engaging with diverse population groups inclusive of their capacities and constraints. ▪ Evidence of an ongoing dialogue/relationship being established with all relevant population groups. ▪ Evidence of population groups' preferences in relation to participation (how, when, how often, etc.) being gathered and considered. ▪ Evidence of population groups' safety in relation to participation being considered. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effort to improve gender responsiveness through the women's elected leaders project – to increase the number of women elected to camp management groups - One cited good practice on elected women (only in 4 camps out of 32) – this is an organised election system including a quota system, 1 woman was elected camp representative and other women have been elected block leaders, in the rest of the camps there's no system and traditional leaders are elected ad hoc and only men are elected). • Questioning on women's spaces as spaces that are only for women and the rest of the community does not know what happens there and gives room to rumours. • PSEA Network agencies not communicating well with the community because it is a difficult topic, • Good innovation of self-organizing women's leadership networks. Potential from volunteers for information dissemination although this was not readily accepted at the beginning. Some threats and reaction to women volunteers. Follow up work with imams and other leaders helped mitigate somewhat but still seen as a conservative culture. Progress is seen though. <i>"we feel that we are contributing, my esteem has increased"</i> • One gap – bringing in Bangladeshi women's organizations into the response. Tried to map but hard to find. Response dominated by big INGOs or NNGOs that are not women led, gender sensitive.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of beneficiaries’ satisfaction with the ways and level of engagement 	
<p>1.4 To what extent different capacities on gender (collective, organizational, individual) contribute to ensuring responses are tailored to the needs, capacities, and vulnerabilities of all?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of gender expertise being used in the design and delivery of humanitarian response. ▪ Evidence of commitments to gender equality within strategic planning. ▪ Evidence of SADD and gender analysis across programmes. ▪ Evidence of financial and other resources clearly allocated to addressing gender issues. ▪ Evidence of gender mainstreaming across clusters/sectors/working groups. ▪ Evidence of gender in HC/senior managers performance review. ▪ Evidence of efforts to build/strengthen capacity on gender. ▪ Evidence of a dedicated coordination mechanism (e.g. GRG) on gender being established and functioning. ▪ Evidence of beneficiaries’ perceptions on the adequacy and relevance of the response. ▪ Evidence of dedicated gender expertise across IASC members ▪ Evidence of social norms and gender relations amongst staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender focal points – Each sector has two focal points – one UN and one NGO. One challenge is that they are usually junior level and not highly enough connected to project development and design to inform decision making. Also, not full time, but carrying multiple roles. Therefore, cannot allocate too much time to really support gender mainstreaming in sector. Mostly disseminating awareness and communication. • Life Saving and priorities. At start of response, gender not prioritized – no gender specialist deployed at initial response. <i>We focused on lifesaving first and then when things stabilized we started integrating gender</i> • Gender empowerment indicators. Unfortunately, limited collection of information on gender empowerment indicators. Also, SADD is required but some elements such as disability and diverse populations are overlooked. • Observation that Gender is seen as theoretical. People not necessarily opposed to it but lack practical tips for how this is to be operationalized in their work. <i>“A handbook alone is not enough – there is need for human to human interaction and explanation – especially at the implementation levels”</i> - Some sectors in particular do not see how they can apply gender in their work (site management most frequently cited example). How to make theory practical for the specific sectors. Development of Sector tip sheets. But some concern also that tip sheets may be too formulaic. Need people who are gender sensitives to be opportunistic to new options. • For example – self-organized education networks set up by Rohingya, but not always recognized and collaborated with by Agencies who are following their own processes. Need to be attentive and responsive to these self-organizing opportunities. • UNHCR uses their own AGD Mainstreaming guidelines, no reference to global tools • According to one interview, Sectors made sure to speak with women, girls i.e. in WASH sector Another avenue were the women friendly centres because it gave them an opportunity to talk in a secure environment (good practice), operated by UN Women, UNFPA, Action Aid, CARE etc Many organisations like UNHCR had women centres for active engagement in production like soap making (livelihoods) and community outreach program to train women, girls and boys, and youth to understand protection issues and go out to the community and talk about it. UNHCR and UNFPA with local NGO BRAC implementing GBV program to recruit men and boys as agents of change to address GBV. Certain tools we used, we informed the sector plans to mainstream gender, also monitoring visits to the camps , we did a paper on intersectionality (also in the link). Handicap International targeting disabled, HelpAge with older people, UNFPA also on intersectionality. Considering Rohingya are a very closed society, targeting women alone was important in FGD. • Joint Response Plan 2020 used Gender and Ager Marker (GAM) and from ISCG level there were thorough orientations on how to score the Marker. • Many organizations use SADD while reporting on their activities, particularly 4W, 5W, Sit Reps.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender Hub facilitated. <i>One challenge is when the Gender Focal Point participates in designated sector meetings, it is sometimes tough that their voices would be heard. Also every sector has their own priority programmes, so it is difficult to get their buy-in for gender mainstreaming.</i> • Sector JD – interesting innovation – provide options for persons with social science background to fill technical positions – allows for more flexibility in gender responsiveness • When there is a conflation of GBV and Gender, then it is more difficult to mainstream gender because it becomes viewed principally as a protection issue. Also, most GBV do not do gender work. Difficult to ask a person to take on additional responsibilities when JD is already full. • One thing still lacking are gender strategies for every sector. This would help target support needed and provide more opportunities for accountability. • One innovation to be piloted was to use multi-functional monitoring in routine monitoring. Multiple focal points with checklists to see practical steps taken. • There are not many standalone programmes targeting gender equality. Also, gender mainstreaming activities do not get separate funding. The implementers have to include the activities in the existing programmes. • GenCap from the beginning of the response is important. GenCap tasks are challenging when Agencies have focal points that are not gender experts, who are junior, and who have other responsibilities as well. Need more agency commitment to gender expertise. Same for Sectors. • UN SWAP requirement is that gender focal points should be P-4 or above. Can say that the vast majority of gender focal points are not at that level.
COHERENCE		
EQ2: How consistently are existing system-wide policies, programme guidance and tools on gender implemented among IASC members		
<p>2.1 To what extent are roles and responsibilities (as per the IASC Gender Policy) fulfilled by IASC actors?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of existing system-wide policies, guidance and tools being promoted and rolled-out at both global and field levels. ▪ Evidence of existing system-wide policies, guidance and tools being referenced in key IASC documents. ▪ Evidence of use of existing system-wide policies, guidance, and tools by IASC members at both global and field levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New JRP very gender heavy. Also new indicators. There has been progress in the JRPs as well. GIHA and focal points in sectors took heavy emphasis in advocating for GEEWG considerations in all sectors. ▪ Still need empowerment indicators but SADD data is put in the indicators. However, not all partners require reporting on it and no accountability for not reporting on SADD. Practice is more variable. The new commitments and indicators do allow for potential subsequent accountability and monitoring. ▪ April 2018 – Commitment document taken from Gender Policy and Accountability Framework. ▪ IASC has wonderful PSEA dedicated people and provide a lot of support, every time with HQ focused and need to tailor it to the field, not immediately actionable, i.e. beautiful COVID tool 4pages too long, needs to be shorter, practical so the network does the adaptation. One to one chats with global teams, platform for PSEA coordinators that acts as a community of practice to share tools and this has proven a blessing. No online platforms, it is a common email address and it works to share documents: note, training, saves reinventing the wheel, you know who to contact, you can drop a question and get an answer. Email address set up by organisers of PSEA pilot training for Coordinators at IASC level. Meeting in Geneva with Coordinators, drafted agenda for training and piloted September 2019. It will be launched next year. ▪ In Cox's Bazar we have the global IASC gender policy, in the GiHA working group we put together 6 commitments from the policy applicable in Cox's and endorsed by the SEG and last year we had first learning forum for the gender hub on our gender equality commitment in the response. ▪ Not all actors are aware of the IASC gender policy.

<p>2.2 To what extent is humanitarian leadership at both global and country levels contributing to a coherent and consistent approach to GEEWG in humanitarian response?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of high-level efforts and commitment to institutionalizing and enforcing GEEWG. ▪ Evidence of efforts by leadership to promote dissemination and use of existing system-wide policies, guidance, and tools on GEEWG. ▪ Evidence of efforts by leadership to keep issues of gender, age, sexual orientation, and other social categories as relevant to the context and the crises at the forefront of the response. ▪ Evidence of diversity among leaders as conducive to a more inclusive and participatory humanitarian response. ▪ Evidence of leadership striving towards social change and greater gender justice. ▪ Evidence of efforts by leadership & governance mechanisms to ensure engagement with / accountability to all population groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leadership commitments exist, but some skepticism about whether this is only rhetoric. Gender not a standing item on the SEG agenda - fits into the “other business”. ▪ Cannot actually track gender funding yet. ▪ GBV IS a priority and protection in general – people are serious about protection. However, not always the same for gender. <i>We are treating the symptoms (GBV) rather than root causes (GEEWG).</i> ▪ International staff at leadership positions mostly come for a very short period of time - six months or a year in some cases. This can be a hindrance for them to contribute more effectively to the GEEWG process at Cox’s Bazar level response program - ▪ The main message is that leadership is critical and need to believe in gender otherwise they have no place here. ▪ Another is that coordination needs to work without coordinators being territorial: PSEA, GBV etc are outcomes of gender inequality, power struggles. We need more collaboration. ▪ Leadership commitments exist, but some scepticism about whether this is just lip service. For example, gender is not a standing item on the SEG agenda. Fits into the “other business”. ▪ April 2018 – Commitment document taken from Gender Policy and Accountability Framework. ▪ Not all the interviewed actors were aware of the Gender Equality Commitments from April 2018. ▪ The absence of an HC in this response at the national level was seen as contributing to impeding the degree to which conversations with Government counterparts and co-chairs could be carried out to influence GEEWG sensitivity and mainstreaming in response.
<p>2.3 To what extent have existing system-wide policies, program guidance and tools on gender been consistently used to build the capacity of the IASC members to respond?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of existing policies, programme guidance and tools being consistently referred to/used across training by IASC members. ▪ Evidence of aid workers’ knowledge and use of existing policies, programme guidance and tools. ▪ Evidence of IASC members’ staff perceptions of increased capacity on GEEWG resulting from awareness of and training on existing system-wide policies, programme guidance and tools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Fragile chain to implementation of GEEWG. Commitments and policies exist at a higher level. Actual operationalization dependent on specific personalities and highly dependent on the entire chain from strategic leadership to operational leadership to implementing partners. Many points in the chain susceptible to lack of interest – any point reduces implementation. ▪ <i>GEEWG is very personality dependent.</i> ▪ <i>The problem with these strategies made at the sectoral level is that it takes a very long time to reach the field. Donor agency, to Sector strategy to UN Agency, to partner to the implementing partners. Sometimes in all the stages it gets a bit changed.</i> ▪ The key organizations (e.g. ActionAid Bangladesh, BRAC) have a strong accountability mechanism. Tools include - complaint box, hotline, feedback session, tick boxes with signs/icons etc. ▪ GAM. Different perspectives on GAM. Some liked that it was a mandatory requirement for all project proposals to be subject to GAM ▪ GAM not yet translated to Bangla – not in any Asian language – so this limits how well it is operationalized by the implementing partners. ▪ No gender strategies for every sector these could provide support to target needs for Gender strengthening in the sector and as a mechanism for sector level accountability.
<p>2.4 To what extent are humanitarian programmes aligned to existing policies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of humanitarian response plans and programmes (collective, for e.g. the HRP, and of individual IASC members) referencing existing system-wide policies, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There are many research papers and studies on gender in the response especially from within a protection lens. Some sectors have more than others. ▪ One innovation to be piloted was to use multi-functional monitoring in routine monitoring. Multiple focal points with check list to see practical steps taken.

<p>and tools on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls?</p>	<p>programme guidance and tools on GEEWG.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of humanitarian response plans and programmes (collective, for e.g. the HRP, and of individual IASC members) being built on, and making use of existing policies, guidance, and tools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bangladesh pilot country for finalization of Gender Handbook. Tools, tip sheets, refreshers. ▪ GBV sub sector here very active but element of competition between gender and GBV, especially around key dates like 16 days rambling between UN Women and UNFPA on who’s mandate it is, you can really see the power play. The GBV sector uses the GBV Guidelines, the GiHA group can do more in terms of socialising the IASC gender Policy because when I arrived members did not know about it, not translated, circulating is not enough, you need to discuss about it. ▪ Some observations that internal gender policies and sector gender policies are not always completely aligned. Many implementation partners do not have their own gender policies. Some implementation partners confused about their requirements in specific activities because of contradictions in communications. ▪ Gender is sometimes perceived by Sectors as <i>theoretical</i>. People not necessarily opposed to it but lack practical tips for how this is to be operationalized in their work. <i>“A handbook alone is not enough – there is need for human to human interaction and explanation – especially at the implementation levels”</i> - Some sectors in particular do not see how they can apply gender in their work (site management most frequently cited example). ▪ Frequently expressed concern on how to make theory <u>practical</u> for the specific sectors. There have been developed Sector tip sheets. But some concern also that tip sheets may be too formulaic. <i>We need people who are gender sensitives to be opportunistic to new options not just a tick-box menu.</i> ▪ For example – self-organized education networks set up by Rohingya, but not always recognized and collaborated with by Agencies who are following their own processes. Need to be attentive and responsive to these self-organizing opportunities. ▪ Good practice – overlapping co-chairing the various working groups. Tends to be UN heavy, but allows for the constraints for personnel transitions to maintain continuity because at least one co-chair may be present. ▪ UNHCR example – requiring partners to put aside a budget for a dedicated in-house gender advisor. ▪ Many said that the IASC Gender Handbook is well equipped, however, there are not many training of trainers sessions for using it.
EFFECTIVENESS		
EQ3: How effective are existing IASC-promoted efforts to strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in humanitarian programming?		
<p>3.1 To what extent are roles and responsibilities (as per the IASC Gender Policy) fulfilled by IASC actors?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of enabling factors and challenges in performing the responsibilities assigned to them as per the IASC Policy and related Accountability Framework. ▪ Evidence of IASC members including at least one high/level result on GEEWG in their main strategic document and reporting. ▪ Evidence of gender results in IASC members’ performance review system. ▪ Evidence of actions and commitment by the IASC leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The highest-level leadership seen as significant gender champion. ▪ Agencies supported the GENCAP to integrate gender analysis in needs assessments for sectors linked to the JRP. ▪ Promoting gender sensitivity at the beginning of the response was challenging due to the speed of the start-up. Process was first the formation of a GIHA working group (chaired by UN Women and UNHCR). Then a GENCAP was deployed to support the development of the 2018 JRP. Then agencies started to recruit Gender specialists to support the GENCAP and GIHA WG. Finally, the Gender Hub was formed to pull together resources for mainstreaming gender and other cross cutting sectors such as GBV and PSEA. Gender Hub considered an important contribution to GEEWG. ▪ Challenges with significant turnover of staff and agencies bringing in staff from other emergencies. ▪ Sector JD – interesting best practice – provide options for persons with social science background to fill technical positions – allows for more flexibility in gender responsiveness ▪ Life Saving and priorities. At start of response, gender not prioritized – no gender specialist deployed at initial response. ▪ One criticism in deployment is the timing of the gender expertise coming in after the initial response. Specialists are then not well integrated with team – seen as providing only criticism and requiring changings. Might have been avoided if gender deployed immediately with others.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“Gender should not be an add on – it should be deployed immediately...probably what the international community should do is to have gender expats – with good interpersonal skills – deployed as soon as we start to provide assistance”</i> ▪ <i>“We do not benefit from the knowledge from other operations around the world for learning. If another large scale refugee movement was to take place somewhere in the world, I can assure you that the same mistakes would be done....we don’t seem to learn...we respond as if this were the first response in the world...for example, why isn’t gender involved from the beginning? We deploy gender way down the line, so you are sending the message that gender is secondary”</i> ▪ <i>“When the gender person comes, they have to try and integrate into a team that has already been working. They are seen as the people who come in and only criticize everything that was done before and make extra work for everyone.”</i>
<p>3.2 To what extent have the existing policies, guidance and tools been effective in ensuring capacities on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls are built?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of enabling factors and challenges in the effective use of existing policies, guidance, and tools. ▪ Evidence of ongoing gender training at all levels being made mandatory for all IASC members. ▪ Evidence of entity-wide assessment of capacity on gender of all relevant entity staff carried out by IASC members. ▪ Evidence of all relevant population groups’ perceptions on the effectiveness of the response. ▪ Evidence of use and referencing of existing material in training, project documents, advocacy material, and so on. ▪ Evidence of harmonized, coherent approach by all IASC members on gender in policies and programmatic documents and tools. ▪ Evidence of efforts to engaging with and strengthening national and women’s organizations in the response; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The SEG directive required gender issues to be reported across sectors, also in midterm review, not only GBV and PSEA. Lack of capacity. We conducted an interagency gender capacity assessment and focal points appointed without any background, no capacity, Gender Capacity Learning Assessment inter-cluster, brought together UN agencies, NGOs, local org looking at core gender capacities in place. ▪ Gender empowerment indicators. Unfortunately, limited collection of information on gender empowerment indicators. Also, SADD is required but some elements such as disability and diverse populations are overlooked. ▪ Global tools are seen as useful but require substantive contextualization before they can be applied in the response. ▪ There is an intent to separate gender from GBV, so it is not automatically conflated. GIHA more intention gender than GBV per se. ▪ New JRP is more gender sensitive. Substantive advocacy by the GIHA and Gender Hub to all sectors. JRP contains sector gender mainstreaming and new oriented indicators. ▪ Still need empowerment indicators but SADD targets are linked to the indicators. ▪ However, not all partners require reporting thought SADD and no consequences for not reporting on SADD, leading to more variable practice. ▪ The new commitments and indicators do allow for potential subsequent accountability and monitoring. ▪ <i>Protection is prioritized and taken seriously. More so than gender equality as a whole.</i> ▪ One potential barrier to gender equality mainstreaming is that the actors such as UNFPA with substantive gender mandates are also heavily focused on GBV and Protection - limiting their capacity to provide inputs into gender mainstreaming to other dimensions and sectors. ▪ Gender considerations are most visible in the period of project design and concept papers. Less consistent use of gender sensitivity during implementation, monitoring or analysis.
<p>3.3 To what extent have the existing processes and structures (Theory of Change Platform for Action) been effective in ensuring capacities on gender</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of enabling factors and challenges in the establishment and effectiveness of processes and structures on gender. ▪ Evidence of strategic response planning processes and tools with an integrated gender component. ▪ Evidence of coordination efforts and mechanisms with an integrated gender 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Gender Hub - important pilot. Provides a team of three full time people to provide cross-sectoral support. ▪ The IASC Gender Handbook was piloted in the Rohingya response as well as the final testing of GAM. These pilots were seen as interagency and intersectoral. ▪ GH & GIHA. Some confusion of roles. Especially outsiders see confusion. Could have been GIHA operationalized to do full time Gender support – but would need the funding to provide full time technical support. “GH is an improvement on GenCap because more than one person. Also GH focuses not solely on capacity building. ▪ WG versus Sector/Cluster. <i>Sectors implement – working groups do not implement.</i>

<p>equality and the empowerment of women and girls are built?</p>	<p>component.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of partnership and capacity development efforts with an integrated gender component. ▪ Evidence of consultations and inclusion of national and local women rights and women-led organizations in preparedness and response efforts. ▪ Evidence of funding for capacity strengthening of women-rights and women-led organizations. ▪ Evidence of humanitarian funding accessed by women rights and women-led organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Several respondents mentioned it's easier for the UN funded projects to make adjustments as per the changing needs of the affected people, but for those that are funded by other donors it's really difficult and can only be adjusted after getting permission from the NGO Bureau which is a lengthy process. ▪ Commitments and policies exist higher level. Actual operationalization dependent on specific personalities and highly dependent on entire chain from strategic leadership to operational leadership to implementing partners. Lots of places in the chain susceptible to lack of interest – any point reduces implementation. Reason for this personality dependence is because weak accountability mechanisms. ▪ <i>The problem with these strategies made in the sectoral level is that it takes a very long time to reach the field. Donor agency, to Sector strategy to UN Agency, to partner to the implementing partners. Sometimes in all the stages it gets a bit changed.</i> ▪ <i>"We do not benefit from the knowledge from other operations around the world for learning. If another large scale refugee movement was to take place somewhere in the world, I can assure you that the same mistakes would be done....we don't seem to learn...we response as if this were the first response in the world...for example, why isn't gender involved from the beginning? We deploy gender way down the line, so you are sending the message that Gender is secondary"</i> ▪ GH is a pilot. Challenge is to do the trainings and capacity building (budget, time, scope). GH acknowledges that these things will not happen unless there are dedicated resources.
<p>3.4 To what extent is the work to advance gender equality adequately resourced through funding and staffing?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of enabling factors and challenges in the establishment and effectiveness of processes and structures related to funding and staffing. ▪ Evidence of adequate human and financial resources being allocated to gender-related activities. ▪ Evidence of the right staffing profile in place to deliver on gender issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Gender is accounted as something that will happen without resources: ▪ WG versus Sector/Cluster. <i>Sectors implement – working groups just advise</i> ▪ Gender focal points – Each sector has two focal points – one UN and one NGO. One challenge is that they are usually junior level and not highly enough connected to project development and design to inform decision making. Also, not full time, but carrying multiple roles. Therefore, cannot allocate too much time to really support gender mainstreaming in sector. Mostly disseminating awareness and communication. ▪ Sector JD – interesting innovation – provide options for persons with social science background to fill technical positions – allows for more flexibility in gender responsiveness ▪ When there is a conflation of GBV and Gender, then is more difficult to mainstream gender because it becomes viewed principally as a protection issue. Also, most GBV do not do gender work. Difficult to ask a person to take on additional responsibilities when JD already full. ▪ Five gender officers placed in CiC offices. ▪ UNHCR example – requiring partners to put aside budget for dedicated in house gender advisor. ▪ Donors seen as potential to play a key role if they are engaged. Two donors are seen as prioritizing PSEA: DFID and the Dutch. ▪ Donors perceived agencies as conservative even when donors are asking for innovative approaches: ▪ The consensus is that in comparison to other responses, the Rohingya response is comparatively well resourced and gender is more of a consideration across all programming ▪ Additional Gender capacity strengthening not found in other responses, i.e. Gender Hub, GiHA WG and a number of UN Heads of agencies and NGOs are personally invested. ▪ However, gender sensitivity is not always consistently implemented in the field level: <i>First joint response plan, in theory some issues that sound progressive on paper like accountability and CwC but delivery on the ground is different, not great, big gap partly to do with Bangladeshi gov and Rohingya and women's voice appalling, gov very sensitive about social organization and empowerment approaches so that has made organisations very timid.</i>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>UN Women have been active working with these groups, women from Rohingya community who have gone to the International Court of Justice to provide their perspectives, in the side lines, women are there and strong but no systematic formal engagement, only pockets</i> ▪ Some feel from donors that there are few inter-agency spaces for learning from evaluations. <i>There are Individual Agency evaluations, but lack of lessons learned, and transparency shared across Agencies. GH and GIHA are good practices, but are technical, not the political leadership level.</i> ▪ Bangladesh pilot country for finalization of Gender Handbook. Tools, tip sheets, refreshers. ▪ GH is a pilot. Challenge is to do the training and capacity building (budget, time, scope). GH acknowledges that these things will not happen unless there are dedicated resources. The Gender Hub is connected to Secretariat directly which gives more influence on gender considerations.
3.5 To what extent are IASC efforts contributing to making humanitarian programmes gender-responsive?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of inclusive and participatory humanitarian planning and outcomes. ▪ Evidence of GAM being used consistently by all IASC members. ▪ Evidence of programmes with a GAM codes 3-4. ▪ Evidence of programmatic objectives on GEEWG being met by IASC actors. ▪ Evidence of activities tailored to the needs, power dynamics, and roles of relevant population groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GAM implemented after initial response. Substantive majority of new projects self-assessed as 4 points. ▪ 2020 JRP contains more programmatic objectives related to GEEWG compared to earlier versions. ▪ <i>Because of these platforms we have seen increase of proposals scoring high in GAM, gender reflected in GRP Plan, sector added to multisectoral assessments, gender responsive programming in practice, consultations with women. Very concrete achievements.</i> ▪ Objectives not consistently met according to donor, agency, and sector evaluations. ▪ Evolution of activities tailored to the needs and dynamics of the population although initially weak in the first response. ▪ More emphasis in gender later after initial burst, but retrofitting required to replace original response. Toilets and WASH facilities brought up frequently as examples. ▪ Respondents reported that in the absence of a formalized consultation structure, reliance defaults to informal network of allies and anecdotal processes. Not systematic. ▪ <i>Key learning point from this response: when you get a large well resources response, it is very important to have a learning component institutionalised within the UN Coordination structure to have lessons from other responses and adapt here.</i> ▪ Life Saving and priorities. At the start of response, gender was not prioritized – no gender specialist deployed at initial response ▪ Gender is not considered at the beginning.
COORDINATION		
EQ4: To what extent are efforts by IASC members to strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in humanitarian programming coordinated?		
4.1 To what extent are roles and responsibilities (as per the IASC Gender Policy) by IASC actors contributing to ensuring coordination and complementarity?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of enabling factors and challenges in ensuring coordination and complementarity. ▪ Evidence of IASC members and leaders communicating and championing gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls at all levels and vis-à-vis all actors. ▪ Evidence of gender analysis or gender specific outcomes in Principals' decisions. ▪ Evidence of IASC members encouraging 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Good practice – overlapping co-chairing the various working groups. ▪ Gender hub as a good practice and GiHA WG, with links to Rohingya Women's network. ▪ We have women police deployed to the camps that were not there before, women's leadership rolled out in the camps, making sure women elected as leaders in the camps in the local election through advocacy by GiHA working group, doing joint activities during the key dates to mobilise action, i.e. Joint Dialogues between women leaders and government authorities has become regular practice. ▪ We ask other agencies to provide complementary services for example in markets, practical actions to involve everyone are very welcome, this is pushing through practical actions, we need the resources. I.E we organised a fair in Dhaka with UN agencies to present Rohingya artwork. Doing something in practice.

	<p>ownership of and coordinated action on GEEWG in humanitarian response.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of IASC members actively participating in inter-agency coordination mechanisms on GEEWG. ▪ Evidence of complementarity in gender responsive programming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Engagement in SEG is key for getting into community representation and women’s voice important in the camps, but also gender training to all camp management and SEG management staff, strengthening referral mechanisms and linking to women police, gender officers dedicated sitting in camp management offices supported the government and volunteers the network ▪ Coordination: <i>“the implementing partners doing work in a specific camp are well coordinated, but there is sometimes a lack of coordination between sectors and the partners who work in the field.</i> Also the government may give permission but may not inform the Agencies/sector in a specific camp.
<p>4.2 To what extent is gender responsive humanitarian programming by IASC members coordinated and complementary?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of enabling factors and challenges in ensuring coordinated and complementary gender-responsive programming. ▪ Evidence of gender in humanitarian action capacity at the decision-making level at both global and field levels. ▪ Evidence of establishment of and consultation with gender capacity at the field level to support analysis and decision-making. ▪ Evidence of coordination processes and mechanisms (clusters, and others) consistently integrating gender. ▪ Evidence of initial joint rapid assessments with an integrated gender component. ▪ Evidence of joint needs assessments with an integrated gender component. ▪ Evidence of gender integration in humanitarian needs overviews and response plans. ▪ Evidence of efforts to explore and leverage synergies on GEEWG (for e.g. meetings, roundtable discussion, and so on). ▪ Evidence of gender expertise and capacity (GenCap, Gender Specialist, Gender working group, etc.) available at the Humanitarian Country Team level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Positive references to UN Women and UNHCR as co-chair of the GiHA Group seen as joint effort and accountability for affected populations ▪ GH & GIHA. Some confusion of roles. Especially outsiders see confusion. Could have been GIHA operationalized to do full time Gender support – but would need the funding to provide full time technical support difficult to cover all GEEWG possibilities across all sectors due to scope. GH is an improvement on GenCap because more than one person. Also, GH focus not solely on capacity building. ▪ References made to intent to separate gender equality from GBV, so it is not automatically conflated. ▪ Coordination: Efforts made between GIHA, GBV, PSEA, to provide same message – single communication rather than multiple communications from different working groups and clusters because this was seen as confusing. <i>The different coordination mechanisms are helpful to the extent that they will coordinate with each other.</i> ▪ Perception of information and communication overload from multiple working groups and coordinating mechanisms with gender adjacent mandates (GIHA, PSEA, GBV, CwC, Protection, GH, and so forth). ▪ Gender capacity in the response was seen as growing with time and became well-coordinated. Challenge of the high turnover also affected sector coordinators, but especially from mid-2018,
<p>4.3 To what extent is coordination contributing to gender-responsive humanitarian programming by IASC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Evidence of improved complementarity across IASC members on GEEWG. ▪ Evidence of improved consistency in the analysis of the needs, power dynamics, and roles of relevant population groups among IASC members. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GH and GIHA important for coordination ▪ Improved consistency in the analysis of needs, power dynamics and roles of populations from mid-2018 onwards. However, respondents noted that the COVID-19 response has not been as gender sensitive even though GH and GIHA provided single messaging on gender considerations in the response ▪ 2020 JRP describes gender mainstreaming across sectors and Gender coordination mechanisms. Limited evidence of compliance at the field level.

members?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Evidence of gender mainstreaming across clusters and other coordination mechanisms and processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Coordination:▪ Some observations that internal gender policies and sector gender policies not always completely aligned. Many implementation partners do not have their own gender policies. Some implementation partners confused about their requirements in specific activities because of contradictions in communications.
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3.5 Annex 4: Covid-19 Adjustments to Case Study Approach

Introduction

Given the Coronavirus situation, it has been suggested to modify the GEEWG Bangladesh mission from a full field mission to a partial virtual exercise.

As background, the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and Girls (GEEWG) is a global exercise to determine the degree to which global level inter-agency materials and resources support the application of GEEWG principles in humanitarian response.

The Bangladesh component is a case study exercise to track the linkage from the global level policies, materials, and resources through to the reality experienced by beneficiaries. The chain is tracked through three different levels:

1. To what extent do the global level inter-agency GEEWG resources affect the development of national level GEEWG policies, strategies, and resourcing (incl. joint needs assessments or response plans)? (HNOs, HRP, among others)?
2. To what extent do these national level GEEWG policies, strategies and resourcing in turn affect local level programming in terms of GEEWG sensitivity?
3. To what extent does the local level programming with GEEWG sensitivity affect the participation and experience of local beneficiaries?

This case study – along with the other country case studies in Nigeria, Colombia, and Iraq – are intended to contribute to the overall global evaluation findings. The Bangladesh case study brief is a 10-page report that will be included as a technical annex in the overall global IAHE GEEWG evaluation report. The Bangladesh case study does NOT include recommendations specific to the Bangladesh response. The IAHE recommendations are for IASC members at the global level regarding inter-agency GEEWG global resources.

Adjustments

The team is composed of two international consultants and two national consultants. The national consultants are based in Dhaka.

The proposed adjustment is to limit all travel and access to the camps through the following measures:

1. The two international consultants will carry out **virtual interviews** with the selected UN and INGO stakeholders while the two national consultants will carry out virtual interviews (Skype, Zoom, or WhatsApp) with the National NGOs stakeholders and Government stakeholders as well as focus group discussions (FGDs) with affected populations.

The time period for interviews and FGDs is suggested to be expanded from March 29-April 27 to allow for coordination and scheduling of interviews and to allow respondents to allocate time within the range of Covid-19 response activities.

Number of interviews: The case study would project to have 18-20 KIIs with UN and INGO stakeholders, 12-15 KIIs with NNGO and Government at different levels including with camp management personnel.

The in-country reference group has already developed an extensive list of possible interviewees to be shared with the evaluation team. Communication with stakeholders inviting participation will be carried out by OCHA from New York to ease the logistical burden on in-country personnel occupied with the Covid-19 response. Ideally, the selected stakeholders would represent all variety of levels within the Rohingya response. Final invitations to be made in consultation with the in-country focal point and reference group.

UN and INGO Stakeholders (18-20 total)

1. High-level leadership (1-2)
2. IASC member organization leadership (3-4)
3. GenCap or Gender Advisors – both interagency and Agency specific (3-4)
4. Gender cluster or working group focal points (4-5)
5. Sector Coordinators (2-3)
6. Operational programming persons involved in project implementation Cox Bazar (5-8)

NNGO and Government Stakeholders (12-15 total)

1. NNGO leadership (3-4)
2. NNGO programme implementers (3-5)
3. Camp Volunteers (3-4)
4. Government Stakeholders with Humanitarian mandate (3-4)
5. NNGO representatives could include women's organizations, as well as other service delivery organizations.

Scheduling Interviews

The evaluation team would depend on the support from OCHA and the in-country reference group to schedule the selected interviews. Some parameters for consideration.

UN/INGO

- The two international consultants can split, and each take individual interviews although it would be preferable if the high level leadership interviews and the GenCap interviews could be done by both.
- Interviews should be scheduled for about 60 minutes

NNGO/Government

- The two national consultants can split, and each take individual interviews
- Interviews should be scheduled for about 60 minutes in length
- Interviews can be scheduled at any time during the workday.

Debriefings

1. A single virtual briefing to the In-country reference group, the IAHE Management Group and global Advisory Group (global level) would be held in the week after the completion of the remote interviews.

Annex 5: Rohingya Response Coordination Architecture


Dhaka

Dhaka



GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH

HUMANITARIAN STAKEHOLDERS



The Dhaka & Cox's Bazar Humanitarian architecture works to support the Government of Bangladesh's response to the Rohingya Crisis. This Support extends at all the above noted levels in both Dhaka and Cox's Bazar.